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THE POLITICAL IMAGINARY OF CARE: GENERIC
VERSUS SINGULAR FUTURES
CHRISTOPHER GROVES
Abstract: The impacts of the activities of technological societies extend further
into the future than their capacity to predict and control these impacts. Some
have argued that the repercussions of this deficiency of knowledge cause
fatal difficulties for both consequentialist and deontological accounts of future
oriented obligations. Increasingly, international politics encompasses issues
where this problem looms large: the connection between energy production
and consumption and climate change provides an excellent example. As the
reach of technologically-mediated social action increases, it is necessary to ask
whether a political imaginary that extends itself to match this reach requires
new concepts, and how far they should displace traditional political concepts of
obligation, based on reciprocity and harm avoidance. This paper draws on recent
scholarship on the role of concepts of care in political philosophy, bringing
together phenomenological and feminist concepts of care in contributing to a
positive concept of non-reciprocal intergenerational obligation that defends a
constitutive connection between care and justice.
Keywords: Attachment, care ethics, Hans Jonas, intergenerational justice,
responsibility, uncertainty
Introduction
The issues of how to determine what our responsibilities to future generations
are, and how these relate to the tools we possess for knowing about the future,
are increasingly the subject of international political debates. The emergence
of a variety of transboundary environmental risks, from acid rain to ozone
depletion, has led to this emerging focus, with the most obvious contemporary
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condensation point for these concerns being anthropogenic climate change
(ACC). Establishing international compacts to coordinate action on ACC has
made only slow progress. Many have seen the best hope for producing
such agreements as lying in unambiguous climatological evidence of rising
temperatures and the causal role of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Nonetheless,
predictions regarding future trends are hedged about with currently irresolvable
uncertainties, meaning that, rather than a single future trend being identified, a
set of future climate change scenarios exists.
The Stern Review, The Economics of Climate Change (published in 2006)
responded to these ambiguities with a case for action that employed the
methodology of neoclassical welfare economics, including integrated cost-
benefit analysis (hereafter CBA). The intention was to persuade political and
business interests of the urgent need for action by appealing to rational self-
interest. The cost of failing to reduce GHG emissions was estimated to be
between 5% and 20% of global GDP. By comparison, achieving a reduction of
GHG atmospheric concentrations to between 500 and 550ppm CO2 equivalent
was assessed as costing about 1% of global GDP. The Review argued strongly
that this evidence placed a strong responsibility on governments now to take
committed collective action to mitigate GHG emissions and prepare for the
impacts of whatever climate change is produced by the GHGs already in the
atmosphere.
The problem of ACC is, like many other concerns regarding transboundary
environmental risks, one which involves both complex interactions between
social and natural systems, and significant temporal latency of effects. Some
have pointed to the deep penetration of advanced technologies into the everyday
life of contemporary societies as a major factor in the increasing number of
such risks (Beck 1992). But as ACC makes clear, the technical sophistication
of technologies is not itself enough to account for this increase. Technologies
may be crucial ingredients in creating such problems, but what makes some
dangerous and not others is whether or not their use triggers processes which
penetrate deeply and widely into natural structures and systems, and whether
or not these causal processes can easily be arrested or reversed by stopping or
reducing the use of the technology in question.
Where causal complexity and long-term latency exist, they surround action
in the present with uncertainties, undermining the reliability of scientific
knowledge (Nowotny 2003; Ravetz 2004; Wynne 1992). To achieve maximal
robustness, science relies on past observations to construct predictive theories
about the future. But as Baer and Spash (2008: 11) point out, ‘[h]uman induced
climate change holds the prospect of large-scale unique changes outside human
historical experience’. The future, as subject to such phenomena, cannot be
extrapolated from the past because there is no observation record with which
the expected events can be compared. In such circumstances, there opens up
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a disconnect between the tools we employ to know the future and the means
by which we intentionally and unintentionally produce it (Adam and Groves
2007). This means that, as societies depend more and more on technologies
which widely and deeply affect natural systems in ways which are irreversible
and/or hard to arrest, it becomes correspondingly harder to rely on scientific,
past-focused forms of knowledge in order to ‘read off’ from predictions about
the future what our obligations to future people should be (Pellizzoni 2004:
553).
The approach taken in the Stern Review is part of a broader approach to ACC,
in which a linear relationship is assumed to exist between climate knowledge
and climate action (Michel 2009: 259). Specifically, it treats the problem of
how to determine the obligations of present people as one of distributive justice,
encompassing questions about how to spread bads (e.g. the costs of waste and
pollution) in a way which maximizes utility across generations. The Review’s
integrated CBA considers the best way to prevent morally significant damage
(loss of utility) is to assign costs properly to expected harms, based on current
extrapolations of the harmful potential of a ton of CO2 equivalent. As Baer and
Spash (2008) have argued, however, there are a variety of problems with this
approach. Some of these derive from how Stern treats uncertainty. Often, they
argue, the approach taken confuses different categories of uncertainty, treating
‘strong’ uncertainty (which derives from irresolvable complexities, or ignorance)
as ‘weak’ uncertainty which can unproblematically be assigned a quantitative
weighting. Overall, Stern effectively assumes that obligations should be decided
on the basis of predictions about what will happen to future levels of utility,
without taking into account the kinds of uncertainties which may affect the
reliability of such predictions.
Phenomena like ACC unravel the connections we have become accustomed to
believing should exist between knowledge and action, with moral decisions and
public policy being ‘read off’ from scientific evidence. As a consequence, the
‘prediction-then-ethics’ approach adopted by Stern is inadequate. An alternative
approach would be to map out the requirements of future-oriented responsibility
in contexts of deep uncertainty by examining what is logically and existentially
unique about our relationship with future generations. I follow this overall
approach in this paper by attempting to show that an analysis of the concept
of care can help us understand the foundations of our obligations to future
generations, what these might be, and how we should employ particular kinds
of social practices in fulfilling them. The same general approach (without
an emphasis on care) has been widely adopted by philosophers writing on
intergenerational justice (IgJ) since the 1960s. Whilst being unable for reasons
of space to examine this literature comprehensively, I shall argue that certain
exemplar approaches within it fail to fully critique the assumptions which
underlie the kind of approach taken by Stern.
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The account of care I give is developed in dialogue with the present-focused
theory of obligation given by Daniel Engster (2006; 2007). Engster gives a
minimalist account of care as concerned with supporting the social functioning
of others. In contrast, I focus on care as a subjective orientation which is
rooted in particular qualities of character, expressed through particular practices,
and – most importantly – focused on particular goods. These constitutive goods
are particular and singular satisfiers of needs whose own individual, singular
futures are fragile and require non-reciprocal support from those to whom
they matter. The reason why such goods matter to subjects is bound up with
their value as the materials for projects through which subjects construct
themselves as possessing identity and agency within individual and collective
narratives. I agree with Engster, however, that an analysis of human subjectivity
as inescapably vulnerable and dependent on others underwrites particular
normatively valid obligations – only here, with respect to future people rather
than to contemporaries.
My account argues that an ethics and politics of care is necessary to
understand the specific position of future people vis-à-vis present ones, and that
only such an ethics and politics can effectively undermine the set of constitutive
presuppositions – or political imaginary (Castoriadis 1998; Buck-Morss 2000:
11–12; Taylor 2004: 28) – which supports the kind of approach taken by Stern,
and which remains at least partially intact beneath the properly philosophical
positions on IgJ which I examine in the next section. This imaginary represents
the relationship between present and future people as a conflictual one between
sovereign consumers of goods, and imagines the temporal field in which they act
as facing an ‘empty’ or generic future (Adam and Groves 2007: 71–5), in which
possibilities for action are related to key mathematical variables that describe
a society as a more or less closed economic system, and where uncertainty is
an additional parameter which is either to be quantified or ignored. An account
of the relationship between present and future people in terms of care replaces
these assumptions with ones which are more adequate to address certain key
aspects of this relationship. For example, it frames dealing with uncertainty
as a eudaimonistic project concerned primarily with the singular futures of
constitutive goods. These goods, and the wider effects of caring for them, will
contribute to how future people fulfil their needs. Central among these needs
are needs for identity and agency, which, rather than being needs that must
be fulfilled in addition to others, are fulfilled as part of how other needs are
fulfilled. Moreover, a care perspective enables us to understand present and
future subjects, not as passive consumers of goods or as isolated autonomous
rational agents, but as relational, active interpreters and creators of their world.
Having shown how this alternative political imaginary shapes an account of IgJ
that supports intergenerational obligation, I outline some implications for the
international politics of ACC.
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Philosophical Reflections on Future Oriented Responsibility
The appearance of intergenerational justice as a specific topic within applied
ethics and political philosophy is first noticeable in the 1960s and 1970s, with
debates being decisively influenced by both the contribution of John Rawls in
A Theory of Justice (1972) and the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report
(1972). A key impact of these texts, and particularly of Limits, was the sense that
ongoing commitments in developed countries to undifferentiated growth were
subject to uncontrollable contingencies. What might be called the first generation
of philosophical enquiry into IgJ largely concerned the role of neoclassical
economics, and in particular Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks optimality criteria,
in public policy affecting future generations. Many important contributions
examined whether an efficient intergenerational distribution on these terms could
be said to be a just one, and if not, what additional ethical principles should
be used to guide choices. The resulting debates, up until the mid-1980s, also
produced a great deal of sceptical reflection on the extent to which a range
of traditional moral concepts were applicable in IgJ. I will pick out here for
attention some key features of these debates, including characterisations of
the limits of ‘prediction-then-ethics’ type approaches, defences of neoclassical
approaches utilising CBA, and some aspects of the theories of obligation
produced by Rawls, Daniel Callahan, and Brian Barry.
Douglas MacLean has referred to the neoclassical approach (which remains
the basis of Stern’s analysis) as the ‘standard economic view’ (SEV) of future-
oriented obligations, pointing out that its coherence requires several basic
assumptions, which rest on implicit and morally-significant value judgements.
Perhaps the most basic of these is that of consumer sovereignty, i.e. that those
currently with the power to dispose of earned income have the right to do as
they wish with this power. Further, it is generally assumed within this paradigm
that consumers are rationally self-interested, and that therefore, inter alia, they
will manifest through their choices some rate of time-preference that justifies the
discounting of future costs and benefits. MacLean writes:
Confronted with this fact, economists will then marshal forth other arguments about the
opportunity costs of investment, improving living standards, technological progress,
and the uncertainty of long-range forecasting, optimistically assuring us that the world
works to make future generations at least as well off as we are, even though we
explicitly refuse to regard their welfare as equal in value to our own. (1983: 189)
These ‘other arguments’ represent, in reality, further assumptions. The most
immovable of these is perhaps that growth of outputs is inevitable, and that this
growth is identical with social progress as such, insofar as growth ensures future
people will enjoy more utility than present or past generations, thus ensuring
intergenerational efficiency. The idea of special obligations to future generations
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is, in effect, rejected. By ensuring there are no inefficient restrictions in place
on the opportunities enjoyed by individuals for maximizing utility, the future
will take care of itself. Business as usual is the most morally and politically just
policy.
The perspective MacLean outlines positions the subject as a self-interested,
present-focused economic actor. The forms of knowledge available to such
actors, informed by neoclassical interpretations of efficiency and optimality,
represent the future as generic and as empty (Adam and Groves 2007: 71–2).
This is the future understood as the aggregate outcome of mathematically
describable, mechanistic economic processes, making society the mirror of
nature. The subject, however, is within this mechanistic web, yet not entirely of
it: for those who understand the laws which describe its functioning, the empty
future also holds infinite possibilities for the further development of the means
(such as technological innovation) to continuing economic growth. The subject
who is not only self-interested but who pursues these interests rationally is one
that rises above his or her non-economic entanglements, becoming a manager of
resources, in control of the essential aspects of social reality (Macintyre 1981:
71). The manager’s vocation is to employ disinterested economic knowledge
in the service of consumer preferences. In other words, the ultimate good and
value judgement that underlies the SEV is that individuals get what they want
(de-Shalit 2000: 79).
The assumptions, or better (in order to emphasise their internal consistency),
the imaginary underlying the SEV became increasingly influential in the 1970s
on models of decision making in public policy. This perhaps reflected the
prominence of public choice theory as developed by, for instance, Buchanan
and Tullock (1962). Some sociologists have suggested that the employment
of formal methods of risk assessment (including CBA) in the public arena
‘acts as a neoliberal counterweight to bureaucratic creep and inefficiency and
mitigates tendencies within government to risk aversion’, thus making policy
choices defensible in a society increasingly dominated by neoliberal economic
and political rationality (Rothstein et al. 2006: 99).
CBA involves assigning of utility or cash values to all losses and benefits
foreseen as issuing from a decision, and mandates a policy goes ahead if
benefits in terms of utility are greater than costs. A defence of the philosophical
foundations of CBA, specifically with respect to future-affecting choices, is
given by Leonard and Zeckhauser (1986). They argue that risks associated
with future-affecting choices should be treated in the same way as any other
private good (‘commodity’), on the assumption that exchanges of private goods
between informed and competent individuals are the best way to ensure that
benefits are maximized and costs minimized. The problem that public managers
face in making decisions which affect the future is that market mechanisms or
political processes that can generate consensus are unavailable – mainly because
not all those who will be affected by these decisions can participate, whether
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in markets or in politics. Risk-cost-benefit-analysis, they suggest, can serve as a
method for public officials of modelling the outcomes of different choices as if
standard mechanisms of efficient distribution existed.
The foregoing has outlined how the SEV (and its extension through risk-
cost-benefit analysis) views ‘scientific’ knowledge as the best basis for ethical
and political conclusions, and yet is based on a largely unacknowledged
imaginary which represents the future as an empty, mathematically modellable
space in which action is subject to no special obligations owed to future
generations (and indeed where their well-being is assumed to be best served
obliquely, via present-favouring assumptions like pure-time preference and
future-discounting). Ironically, given that economists are keen (as MacLean
observes) to point out how future-discounting can be justified on the basis
of present uncertainties, this view nevertheless assumes that there can be no
radical discontinuities between the present and future, and that for all practical
purposes it makes sense to treat the future as a continuation of already-
established trends. In giving now a brief survey of some key themes which
emerged from philosophical reflections on IgJ in the period roughly between
1971 and 1985, I want to outline how some key philosophical contributions set
out to critique the SEV and its basic assumptions. What these contributions
share is a methodological approach which examines closely the logical and
existential nature of our relationship with future generations – beginning from
the observation that, as Robert E. Goodin notes, future generations are
‘completely dependent on us for providing help or averting harm’ (1985: 177).
As we shall see, their success in undermining the SEV is, however, partial.
We begin with the contractarian theory presented by John Rawls. Rawls
begins his treatment of intergenerational ethics with the observation that what
is true of relationships between contemporaries is not true of relationships
between present and future people, as these are not conditioned by Hume’s
‘circumstances of justice’, in which taking action cooperatively to allocate scarce
goods appears the most self-interestedly rational course of action. Consequently,
rather than grounding an intergenerational contract on self-interested reciprocal
duties, Rawls’ account reflects different general criteria for rational agreement.
These concern what should be included in a social contract worked out from
an ‘original position’ where no knowledge of one’s identity and final position
in a particular society is available. This undermines, from the start, any moral
justification for future discounting. Rawls goes further towards undercutting
the economic view, proposing that basing views of justice on utility is not
enough to attain ‘fairness’ (1972: 13). Instead, he argues for a threshold-type
approach based on what he calls the ‘social minimum’ of resources required
to establish and maintain institutions which effectively embody principles of
fairness. The mechanisms required to establish this minimum must achieve ‘real
capital accumulation’, including net investment in various forms of (effectively)
technological/fixed and social/cultural capital (1972: 252). A rational actor, in
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the original position, would always choose public policy that sets a savings rate
commensurable with ensuring that fair institutions are created.
Not knowing which generation one is likely to find oneself in, one should opt
for the just savings policy, thus founding an intergenerational social contract on
fairness alone. But, as Robert E. Goodin has noted, this appeal to fairness is still
insufficient: one can expect to find oneself within some particular generation,
who may or may not have benefited from past savings. But why would one
then, on the basis of self-interest, take on the obligation of saving for the future
(1985: 171)? Rawls assumes that the subject confronting the original position is
a ‘liberal’ one, whose concern for intergenerational fairness is founded on the
connection between self-interest and fairness. Yet such a subject would lack any
motivation for such concern, as self-interest alone does not imply any demand to
care beyond the present generation.
An alternative approach to the founding of an intergenerational contract, and
with it, a foundation for moral obligations that would undermine the SEV,
is provided by Daniel Callahan (1971), who argues that the basis of future-
oriented obligation lies in a different form of subjectivity to that invoked by
the economic view and by Rawls, namely the subject as parent. Here, the moral
subject is assigned a particular role-based identity, one for whom problems of
future uncertainty do not have the same weight as for the SEV’s managerial
subject, as a lack of full knowledge of what a child may need in the future
is no excuse for ignoring or not adequately fulfilling one’s obligations to it.
Consequently, as future people are causally dependent on present people, there
exists an implicit contract between those alive now and their descendants, which
imposes general and particular obligations upon the present. But the idea that
parental responsibility establishes such a ‘contract’ is criticised by Goodin. He
notes that this argument has a considerable historical pedigree, but that historical
examples of it also tend to recognize the dependence and vulnerability of the
child as the root of obligation, rather than some implicit voluntary agreement
(1985: 80–82). The existence of the asymmetry of power between child and
parent is natural, but how it is acknowledged and responded to, he argues,
is socially variable. It is the dependence of the child which creates parental
responsibility, not some implicit idea of a contract. But the responsibility for
dealing with needs can be socially distributed in many different ways.
Brian Barry’s (1983) objections to ‘prediction-then-ethics’ approaches are
more direct than Callahan’s, ruling out at the start any approach that seeks
to deduce the nature of future-oriented obligations from predictive knowledge
concerned with costs and benefits: predicting future utility is impossible. His
argument is, again, that the nature of our relationship with future generations
can shed light on our obligations to them. A significant proportion of the first
generation IgJ debates concerned what would be best for future individuals,
exploring person-affecting rules for allocation that fell foul of what Derek Parfit
(1986) famously articulated as the ‘non-identity problem’, namely that the power
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of present generations over the future lies in their power to effectively change
who gets born and when, thus rendering logically incoherent decision rules that
concern themselves with what happens to individual people. Barry avoids this
set of problems, noting that what matters, from the point of view of justice,
is not what individual people get out of their opportunities, but how far future
generations (whoever comprises them) have access to a range of opportunities
commensurate with achieving ‘welfare’. He thus follows a strategy similar to
that recommended by MacLean (1983: 186–7), who argues that, while the non-
identity problem shows we do not have the power to affect the lives of future
people for better or worse, we do have the power to create future worlds in which
better-off or worse-off people will live.
By welfare, Barry means free access to a sufficient (i.e. fair) share of
resources, that is, what he calls ‘productive potential’, or in other words, capital
(physical/natural, financial, technological, social). Future generations should be
left no worse off in terms of access to productive potential than they would have
been had our depleting activities not taken place – more technology and capital
needs to be produced to compensate for losses.
But the problem with this approach – like the SEV – is that it demands
managerial foresight. We need to at least replace the productive potential
we deplete, substituting technological and social capital for natural where
necessary, but to do this on a large scale presupposes a governance architecture
robust enough either to manage investment directly or to ensure that market
mechanisms exist to direct resources towards replacing lost capital. Treating
the capacities needed by future people as productive capital would be a
necessary conceptual step, but, as various critics of neoliberalism have pointed
out, this effectively extends market relations and the forms of evaluation they
require to cover both non-market social relations (Fine 2003) and the support
provided by ecosystems (O’Connor 1994). A variety of commentators have
written extensively on the difficulties with such an approach. These include
epistemological problems entailed by extending market relations to assign values
to natural systems (Farrell 2010), and issues of injustice arising from, on the one
hand, the forcible translation of incommensurable values into commensurable
forms (Baer and Spash 2008: 20–21; O’Neill 1993: 119–21; Raz 1986: 350–51),
and on the other, the deepening of inequalities of accumulation associated with
such strategies (Harvey 2003; O’Connor 1994). As well as creating new ethical
and political problems, the approach recommended by Barry does not address
the epistemological issues implied by the SEV: although we do not face the
problem of predicting utilities (as in the SEV and Stern Review) we are required,
as Barry acknowledges, to base our decisions now on predictions about the
efficiency of our efforts to compensate future people with more capital (Barry
1983: 27–9). But the power of the present over the conditions of life of the
future comes with an uncertain degree of ignorance. This places in question our
confidence that we can adequately assess how to proceed on the basis of the kind
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of comprehensive CBA that Leonard and Zweckhauser recommend as a major
input into policy. It is just this kind of policy input, however, that is required if
the distributivist scheme Barry calls for is to be put into practice.
These three positions represent key examples from the philosophical literature
to derive general future-regarding obligations from reflections on the nature
of the relationship between present and future generations. Each is, however,
insufficient. Barry’s approach recognizes most explicitly the problems with the
SEV, but fails to extricate itself from the imaginary which underlies it. Focusing
on productive capital does not avoid the disconnect between knowledge and
action which bedevils utility-based approaches. Rawls fails to justify future-
regarding obligations based on the rational self-interest of the ‘disinterested’
individual subject. Callahan attempts to justify the existence of a social contract
with future generations, and with it, the existence of welfare rights for future
people, by drawing an analogy with the situation of parents. But this analogy, as
Goodin points out, is based on a false premise regarding the contractual basis of
parental responsibility.
Care, Subjectivity and Future-Orientation
In this section, we examine in detail how a care-based approach can deal
with the disconnect between knowledge and action that bedevils conventional
understandings of future-oriented responsibility. This will not only enable us to
justify a general obligation on the present to act in the interests of future people,
it will offer insights into what concrete expression this obligation might take
(what kinds of specific duties follow), and how these concrete duties need to
be fulfilled (i.e. what kinds of attitudes and practices need to be employed in
caring). The account of care I give here identifies caring in relation to particular
kinds of constitutive goods, which serve as the materials for projects through
which subjects position themselves as possessing identity and agency within
individual and collective narratives.
It has been noted that attempting to ground IgJ on an account of the rights
of future generations against those of present generations is insufficient to fully
articulate common intuitions about what present people owe to their succesors
(Meyer 2005). A care-based account can provide a more comprehensive account
of future-oriented obligation, one which unites both normative justification and
motivation. It does so without returning us to the kind of ‘prediction-then-
ethics’ approach exemplified by the SEV. In what follows, I develop such an
account by extending an intergenerational interpretation of care ethics I have
outlined elsewhere (Groves 2009) in dialogue with the work of Daniel Engster
(2006; 2007), acknowledging also the contributions of others such as Joan
Tronto (1993) and Fiona Robinson (1999) on how care ethics needs to combine
both care and justice. Although feminist writers have contributed most to our
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understanding of what is ethically significant about caring, I want to defend a
concept of care here rooted in phenomenological interpretations of the concept,
as given by van Hooft (1995), for example. This is because, if we want to define
what caring is, we need to understand what it aims at, that is, what kinds of
goods it is concerned with. To understand the meaning of these goods, it is
necessary to appreciate phenomenologically how they help the subject organise
the boundaries of experience represented by a contingent, uncertain future. I
will therefore outline what is distinctive about care with the assistance of the
concept of a singular future. Its orientation towards singular futures separates
the subject-of-care decisively from the subject as it is represented within the
economic-managerial imaginary of the SEV, oriented towards a future which is
empty and generic.
I begin by contrasting my concept of care sharply with that given by Daniel
Engster. Care, for Engster, is
everything we do directly to help individuals meet their vital biological needs, develop
or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted
pain or suffering, so that they can survive, develop and function in society. (2007:
28–9)
Engster also stipulates that such activities require certain attitudes or virtues, and
must therefore be done ‘in an attentive, responsive and respectful manner’ (31).
In this way, he attempts to avoid the conceptual overstretch exemplified by Joan
Tronto’s definition of care as ‘everything we do to maintain, continue and repair
our “world” so that we can live in it as well as possible’ (1993: 103). In addition,
how care is performed is important, and whether someone is actually cared for
or not as a result of what is done matters.
What Engster’s definition does not include, however, is mention of what
specific kind of goods are aimed at by caring virtues and activities. Here I agree
with Gheaus (2010) that it omits consideration of important needs which, I shall
argue, relate to the constitution of identity and thereby to constitutive goods. In
particular, these have to do with how experiences of attachment serve to produce
and sustain the identity of the individual and her sense of having individual and
(with others) collective agency, ‘living forward’ into the future. As a result,
Engster’s definition does not fully escape from the imaginary that underlies
the SEV. The subject of care, as Engster represents it, is first dependent, then
care-giving. Looked at from a developmental perspective, it receives the care
needed to develop the basic capacities necessary for social functioning, then
on assuming the role of carer, cares in turn for others who are in a position of
dependency.
In childhood and old age, and at many points in between (as when we are ill
or subject to other contingencies), we are dependent on others, meaning that
relationships between people tend to be asymmetrical rather than reciprocal.
Indeed, Engster notes that dependency is an inextricable part of our everyday
175
Christopher Groves
lives even when healthy or otherwise capable, as we depend on a complex web
of caring services provided by others, and by others for others, in order to survive
(Engster 2007: 41–3). True as these observations are, as Engster represents the
subject, its dependence remains essentially a relationship whose nature can be
understood by isolating those involved in it as producer and consumer of a
good. As dependent, the subject is simply characterised by a lack which subjects
her to dependence on the efforts of another. This, however, misrepresents the
relational nature of care, producing an individualistic picture of subjects whose
relationship with others, while asymmetrical, is asymmetrical in one direction
only.
If we examine the nature of care in a phenomenological and developmental
context, we get a more complex picture of dependency. Psychologists working
against the background of attachment theory, such as Daniel Stern (1985), have
noted how closely attachment, and the development of a stable and resilient sense
of self, is bound up with the manner in which needs are satisfied. This is because
experiences of attachment, from infancy onward, produce a sense of what can
be relied on, and with it, expectations of the future. Attachment is the medium
within which children construct, in concert with significant others, a sense
of an uncertain future that nonetheless offers the promise of the continuation
and development of our selves. Furthermore, attachment relationships are more
dialectical than Engster’s capability-based account allows. Stern, Bruschweiler-
Stern and Freeland (1998) describe the mutual dependence between mother
and child, which is a product of the mother’s non-reciprocal attentiveness
to and effective caring for her child. Even though the growing child does
not consciously ‘take care’ of the mother, its own attentiveness to her has,
phenomenologically, to be seen as two sided. Not only is it bound up with the
child’s need to ensure that its own needs are met, but it also involves responding
attentively to the moods of the mother.
It is through these responses that the child awakens affectively to the intrinsic
identity of her caregiver. The narrative in which mother and child are involved
is not one of production and consumption (even if what is being produced
and consumed is caring activity), but one of ongoing, developing mutual
attachment through which their respective identities are transformed. Although
it is easy to identify here a non-reciprocal and asymmetrical relationship of
caring directed from mother to child, neither partner is simply a consumer
of care.1 To characterise their relationship as simply one-way dependent
at different moments (at t=1 the mother cares for the child; at t=2 the
child, now grown, cares for the now elderly mother) is inaccurate. These are
important observations, as we have now moved away from Engster’s minimal
understanding of care. Although there are more minimal forms of care that
are not necessarily bound up with emotional attachment, these are themselves
derivative upon, developmentally speaking, the more involved sense of care I
have outlined here. Care, in this fuller sense, is bound up with attachment, and as
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such is directed towards particular kinds of values. These values are constitutive
in nature. They are others on whose intrinsic well-being we are dependent to
some degree for our own.
These values can be contrasted with goods that are of purely instrumental
value, i.e. purely useful relative to the subject’s interests, with any functionally
equivalent satisfier being substitutable for them. Constitutive goods, on the other
hand, have value as ingredients in a meaningful or good life. Their worth stems
from their existence as particular individuals. Their value to the subject lies in
how their intrinsic worth adds to the subject’s own flourishing. I have noted
already how attachment relationships create stable expectations, with which
comes the possibility of trust (in other humans and in the surrounding world in a
more general sense). Looked at as constitutive values, objects of attachment can
be seen as shaping an emotional armature in which the subject’s life can take on
a narrative structure. In attachment psychology, a similar idea is expressed in the
concept of the ‘safe space’, in which the infant learns to explore the world around
it, cognitively modelling in the process the responses and, later, the interests
of the other subjects whose comings and goings define this space (Bretherton
1992). The emotional space defined by attachments is one populated by others
who have their own pasts and, importantly, their own dependent, singular
futures.
The first attachment relationships, developmentally speaking, are with
caregivers who are attachment objects. But, as I have already noted, there can
be care relationships without attachment (although these are derivative upon
the more constitutive kinds of care described above). Conversely, care tends to
define our non-reciprocal relationship with other kinds of constitutive values on
which our capacity for identity, trust and agency is dependent. Developmentally,
various different classes of attachment objects extend and consolidate the ‘safe
space’ of reliable relationships, generating in the process a variety of forms
of trust and supporting a secure sense of identity. I have proposed (Groves
2009), following Marris (1996), that there are a number of classes of attachment
object which play this identity-constitutive role. These include other particular
people, but also places (Altman and Low 1992; Morgan 2010), cultural objects
(Wallendorf and Arnould 1988; Young 1989), institutions (Edelstein 2004) and
ideals (Marris 1996). All these kinds of objects can be enlisted as ingredients
for the subject’s sense of individual identity and group belonging, creating
webs of attachments which consolidate secure patterns of bodily and affective
engagement with the surrounding world, one’s sense of self, and confidence
in one’s own agency. Clearly, the relationship between the subject and its
attachments is not generally parental in nature, yet the subject’s concern with
a landscape, an institution or an ideal identifies the object in each case as being
of constitutive value, as sui generis, and as essentially irreplaceable – such that
the loss of the object does not simply call for replacement, but may also (to a
lesser or greater extent) solicit a response of grieving (Marris 1986: 1).
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Attachment, in this sense, is not another need over and above others. Rather,
attachment to constitutive values is an additional dimension of how other needs
are satisfied over time. Fraser (1998) has argued that needs must, in order to be
adequately understood, comprehended in their historically evolving forms. We
do not encounter ‘general’ or ‘basic’ needs, except in cases of extreme distress
(when, on a purely instrumental basis, any roughly functionally equivalent
signifier will suffice). Instead, on surveying how needs are met in a given culture,
we encounter particular and singular objects that have come to count, within
specific socio-cultural contexts, as satisfiers. To understand what is required to
supply a subject’s needs, it is not enough to posit a general or basic need and
then select an instrumentally useful satisfier. Neither is it sufficient to posit an
objective list of needs and then score someone’s flourishing on how far they have
satisfied these needs. This fails to appreciate ‘the role of history and narrative in
appraising how well a person’s life goes’ (O’Neill et al. 2008: 196), and how
far a particular subject’s life is provided with a range of singular constitutive
goods through which she is able to construct, on her own and with others,
her own projects, sui generis commitments that define ‘what her life is about’
and contribute to her sense of integrity, her capacity to be a future-affecting
agent (Smart and Williams 1973: 116–17). As ingredients in these projects,
constitutive values bring with them their singular futures (which are themselves
dependent on contingencies that are to some extent, outside direct control). The
singular futures of these values therefore matter intrinsically to the subject, as
what happens in these futures affects the flourishing of the subject that cares
about them. It is because of their intrinsic value that the subject needs to cultivate
certain virtues in order to care properly. To care properly is, for example, to care
respectfully: what we want to do for x, whether x is another person, a painting,
a feature of a valued place, or an ideal may not necessarily be what is best for
x’s future. Learning attentiveness, patience and respect is a vital part of learning
how to care, not only in our most intimate relationships, but in extended forms of
care – both in caring relationships where little or no attachment is involved, and
in attachment relationships with non-human others. The kind of non-reciprocal
care which is involved in early attachment experiences, directed at modelling,
anticipating and tending for the needs of particular or singular others, thus helps
develop the kind of care which we exercise with respect to a variety of significant
objects.
Subjects, as subjects of care, are not therefore simply consumers. Instead,
they are existentially dependent on a variety of constitutive values which,
whilst they may have some instrumental value, primarily embody forms of
life, the ways in which needs are satisfied for particular people within specific
cultures, who participate in these forms of life through their projective care for
constitutive values. Though Engster is right to recognize that human life cannot
be adequately understood without acknowledging the place of dependency
within it, he does not go far enough in detailing what this dependency entails.
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Human agency is developed, in the first place, through attachment, which
supports reliable expectations and a secure sense of a hospitable future. But
agency is therefore inseparable from care, from a need to pay respectful and
responsive attention (employing imagination and empathy) to the needs of the
constitutive values upon which our capacity for making sense of our place in
the world depends. Care, which connects together self-concern and concern for
others, entails concern for the flourishing of constitutive values, for their singular
futures.
From Attachment to Intergenerational Justice
The account of care I have given so far defines it as emerging from the
attachments which grant to the subject a sense of ‘ontological security’ in the
world it inhabits. However, if care is primarily oriented towards the singular
futures of attachment objects, how is it possible to make a connection with
spheres of concern which extend beyond the boundary of our own lifespans?
I will now show how a care perspective can help us understand how care
necessarily extends beyond our perhaps parochial circle of attachments in the
present, and further, towards future people as such. I will also show how
the necessary extension of care underwrites a normative justification of the
obligation to care for future people, without which the strictly moral content
of a care perspective remains in question.
Thus far, the account of care I have given may be interpreted as what
Habermas (1998: 13–14) refers to as an ‘empiricist’ ethics. I have told a
developmental story which relates to the genesis of care for constitutive values,
and to how this capacity for caring extends itself to encompass different varieties
of attachment object that, over time, play a role in shaping the identity and
agentive capacities of human subjects. As I noted earlier, the role of ‘modelling’
(a concept drawn from attachment psychology) in the development of care
is central. Employing imaginative perspective-taking to try and anticipate the
actions and needs of others is a capacity that is trained by modelling, firstly,
the reactions and dispositions of caregivers, and then the interests and singular
futures of an expanding range of others. The next logical step in presenting
an account of care as a moral orientation might be to show how modelling,
a part of individual psychological development, becomes generalised more
widely to cover less proximate concrete others and distant hypothetical others.
Consequently, it extends to explore what count as the wider conditions of well-
being for those constitutive values closest to us, before going on to (more
sketchily) model the needs of distant individuals, by drawing on familiar
experiences to attempt to model the unfamiliar (Groves 2009). Further, we come
to recognize that our acts of caring, and our being-cared-for, are themselves
both dependent on the acts of others, and on bodies of practice and institutional
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arrangements, which provide the support systems that make our own extension
of caring possible (Kittay et al. 2005). We might also add that they are dependent
on extra-social, i.e. ecological relationships.
True though these observations regarding the need to practice extended care
may be, none of this supplies the normativity that, for Habermas, elevates a
merely empirical, genealogical account of morality to a moral theory as such,
one which ‘accounts for the normative priority of duties’, employing criteria
such as justice or fairness. So far, we remain tied to particular obligations that
attach only to a particular individual on the basis of what she happens to care
about. I shall now show how the structure of care enables us to derive normative
content from the account I have given, building on an argument presented by
Engster. Following Alan Gewirth, he argues that we should analyse the ‘moral
claims and principles necessarily implied by people’s actions’ (Engster 2007:
45) in order to understand what obligations follow immanently from the role
care plays in human lives. Given that all humans are subject to external and
internal contingency and uncertainty they are thus adventitiously dependent on
webs and circles of particular people and particular institutions. These people
and institutions provide them with the support they need in order to meet their
basic needs and to exercise agency in the face of uncertainty. Consequently,
Engster argues, individuals have a duty to act in accordance with the principle
that it is right to recognise the claims of others to care as morally valid, subject
to certain conditions, that is, without ‘significant danger to ourselves, seriously
compromising our long-term functioning, or undermining our ability to care
for others’ (49). If someone fails to acknowledge this duty, then they enact
a performative contradiction by implicitly renouncing the principle which has
justified and will continue to justify their own entitlement to care.
Can we adapt Engster’s argument to justify extending care, via the modelling
of what instrumental and constitutive goods (including institutions and social
relationships) their flourishing may require, to future people? In some ways,
it is even more emphatically relevant here than it is to relations between
contemporaries. Present people have benefited from the care of previous
generations in a variety of ways. Not only have they benefited materially from
technological and economic capital, and the evolving relationships between
society and nature, that have resulted from the historical processes that shape
the present, they have benefited from the care of previous generations for thick
webs of attachment objects.2 Their care has shaped a repertoire of particular
and singular satisfiers which conditions the cultural ‘space of possibilities’
in which individuals will develop their own attachments. Through their own
individual attachments, individuals thus participate in collective narratives that
help consolidate stable expectations of the future, shaped ultimately by ideals
of the good life. It would therefore be contradictory, as in Engster’s account
of relationships of care between contemporaries, for present people to ignore
the obligation to extend care towards the future, as to do so would imply that
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they have disavowed a principle on which they, as beneficiaries of past practices
of caring, have relied. But more fundamentally, my analysis here has shown
how care is, at bottom, care for the singular futures of objects of attachment.
Although these singular futures can of course be of varying extent (ranging, for
example, from the lifespan of my children to the future of a landscape in which
nature and human society will continue to be intermeshed), they tend to link both
proximate and distant generations. This is significant insofar as the logic of the
relationship between the subject of care and its objects of attachment means that
the ultimate significance of an individual’s life rests on what happens beyond
its end (O’Neill 1993). This is true both from the point of view of the individual
living now anticipating how the future will turn out, and will be true for posterity,
looking back on what she did. Disavowal of care for the future as such implicity
entails a disavowal of care for the constitutive values about which we do actually
care, here and now. As such, it denies the constitutive role of aspects of human
subjectivity which are fundamental to the meaningfulness of human experience,
and to the possibility of human flourishing as such.
The role played by care in human development thus enables us to derive a
normative justification for extending caring practices towards a future extending
beyond our own life span. We can now go on to say more about what concrete
kinds of responsibilities extended care, in the present and for the future, entails.
As I have noted, one’s care is, developmentally speaking, initially directed at the
needs of attachment objects: identifying what they may require (instrumentally
and constitutively speaking) in order to flourish as the kinds of entities they
are. As suggested earlier in this section, this will necessarily enlarge the sphere
of care over time. My care for a friend involves me in, to some extent, care
for her attachment objects, insofar as they are constitutive of her flourishing.
But it also demands that I, where necessary, engage in reflection and action
to help build the kinds of social relationships (and, we might add, the kinds
of relationships between the society we are members of and the non-human
world) that are most conducive to the flourishing of the constitutive others we
care about (Groves 2009; Kittay et al. 2005). When it comes to people for
whom we care, opportunities for work, welfare provision, access to education,
and healthcare, childcare and long-term care for the elderly and disabled are
all matters which will arise, sooner or later, for the individual who develops
as a subject of care. But this is not just about dependency in the sense of
consumption of services. As noted in the previous section, care entails respect
for the intrinsic capacities of others. It requires that we build relationships
which support the caring of others. Care thus takes us far beyond face-to-face
attentiveness: it aims at building and sustaining relationships of solidarity that
support strategies of mutual reliance in the face of an intrinsically uncertain
future (Marris 1996), and which respect the non-instrumental value of a range
of others (Jaeggi 2001). Caring for future generations implies further acts of
imaginative perspective-taking, in which virtues additional to those of respect
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and attentiveness are required. Respect becomes humility in the face of one’s
dependence on contingency. This dependence means one must recognise that
one’s capacity to influence the future is limited, and tempered by the agency of
known and unknown others. Attentiveness implies focusing on what will best
promote the resilience of future people, in the face of as yet unknown challenges
both to how they obtain instrumental goods, and to how far they will be able to
engage with the constitutive goods which the present passes on to them.
Caring for the future also implies striving to be critical of the past. As well
as constitutive and instrumental goods, the narratives into which we are placed
contain antagonisms too, deriving from failures of care and of justice. Part of
the meaning of care, however, is that it should actually achieve its goals, that
is, should actually help provide for the needs of others. Employing sympathy,
perspective-taking and imagination to attend to these needs requires that all
means of satisfying needs, and the forms of attachment they support, need to be
assessed for their adequacy. Some attachments may, for example, be negative for
the flourishing of an individual rather than positive. The repertoires of satisfiers
that historical narratives provide as sources of attachment are not simply to be
accepted, as if one’s identity were simply imposed. We discover ourselves to be
inserted into traditions, stories we did not initiate, but ‘when a tradition is in
good order it is always partially constituted by an argument about the goods
the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose’
(Macintyre 1981: 206). The capacity to care for objects of attachment, as anchors
for the projects which shape one’s life and how one participates in wider
narratives, arguably constitutes the core of what Macintyre calls the ‘relevant
virtues’ (i.e. subjective orientations) without which traditions simply decline
and die. Caring means constantly trying to understand how adequate are current
arrangements to satisfying an other’s needs. Because caring always takes place
within a narrative that supports identity and belonging, it inevitably involves
articulating a thick concept of the good life rather than (as Engster maintains) a
minimal conception of needs and their fulfilment. Any critique of how needs are
currently satisfied cannot therefore be undertaken in relation to a fully objective
criterion. Instead, it can only be performed through dialogue between different
understandings of flourishing that aim to determine what different collections
of singular and particular satisfiers reveal about the nature of needs in general.
While predictive knowledge of the kind the managerial imaginary relies on no
doubt has its place in the kinds of deliberation which care requires, it does not
occupy a primary position. Efficiency becomes one value to be weighed against
others.
I have argued in this section that such an obligation can be rationally defended
as a way of making sense of the commitments that are implicit in the dialectical
relationship of self and other expressed in caring. I have also suggested we
need more than this to make this obligation effective, or to understand what is
concretely implied by it. What makes the obligation compelling and motivates
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complying with it is the emotional and practical content provided by caring,
and the extension of a web of connections in the present to form networks of
solidarity that reach out towards the future. The positive goal of care is not to
pass on a set of consumable goods on which future generations will be passively
dependent, but to pass on the ‘materials of care’. These materials include the
narratives which are part and parcel of how material goods are organised and
interrelated as particular and singular satisfiers. Part of the labour of ‘passing
on’ is understanding what forms of material needs-satisfaction will provide the
most resilient armature for supporting these narratives. What is passed on is,
at bottom, the capacity to actively relate to objects of attachment and to care
for them. In other words, the ultimate object of care is care itself, as embodied
in the existence of particular individuals who define themselves within specific
individual and collective narratives. The continuation of the capacity to care,
and to flourish through caring, will protect what Hans Jonas calls the ‘existence
and essence’ of humanity from destruction. Yet it is ultimately only through the
singular futures of what we care about that the future becomes a concrete object
of obligation for us.
Conclusion: Caring for the Future and the Politics of ACC
I return now to the problem with which we began, and the relevance of my
care-based approach to how international politics addresses ACC. Thanks to
the long-term latency of its consequences, ACC cannot be entirely stopped
simply through instigating a stringent programme of GHG emissions cuts today.
Adaptation measures for those most directly exposed to its consequences will
also be necessary. As discussed earlier, the Stern Review represents perhaps the
most comprehensive attempt to present an argument for extensive mitigation and
adaptation measures now. However, as a contemporary example of MacLean’s
SEV, the neoliberal economic and political rationality according to which the
Review formulates this argument directly supports a particular, and questionable,
understanding of how to take responsibility for uncertain future consequences
of present actions. As an example of an SEV-based ‘prediction-then-ethics’
approach, the Review’s CBA analysis frames the options for rational action
in a way which treats arguably irreducible uncertainties in a reductive way
(Baer and Spash 2008), and depicts legislators and businesses alone as having
the managerial agency and expertise needed to deal effectively with these
uncertainties. In closing, I want to offer some suggestions why, given the account
of care-based responsibility given above, this approach represents an inadequate
framing of the future-oriented obligations entailed by ACC, particularly when
compared with other ways of thinking about these obligations (such as the
Greenhouse Development Rights approach). I will also suggest, however, that
even these alternatives require significant adjustment in order to effectively
embody a care-based perspective. Building solidarity in the face of uncertainty is
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perhaps the most significant ethical and political task imposed on us by ACC.
This, however, requires the promotion and sustenance of other forms of political
agency than that of an idealised neoliberal manager, which are oriented towards
care for singular futures.
The CBA undertaken in the Review sets out a case for action based on an
optimal level of emissions reduction, i.e. one that will not entail excessive
global GDP cost, and which will therefore be more likely to command wide
agreement. But the losses represented here are consumption costs, seen from the
perspective of the present against a future discount rate. In a world subject to
environmental and social disruption caused by ACC, the erosion of capabilities,
cultural stability and capacity for stable attachment are dimensions of loss
which will arguably increasingly emerge as the focus for grassroots efforts to
shape international political debates. The singular futures of cultures and the
infrastructures of attachment which support them are inseparable from how
concerns for instrumental needs may be addressed, as is already evident in
the campaigns waged by Pacific island states and indigenous peoples from
other regions threatened by ACC (Blomme 2010). Seen in terms of losses of
incommensurable goods, which cannot be captured within the terms of the SEV,
the effects of present actions on future people require a different normative
framing of obligations.
To address these issues successfully in political agreements designed to
coordinate international action, it is vital to build in explicit recognition of
the unequal (and increasing) impacts of ACC across space and time, of the
ways in which these impacts may include irreversible losses affecting the
‘materials of care’, and of how these future impacts relate to existing global
inequalities – including inequalities in the degree of responsibility for ACC,
given historical patterns of emissions production. An example of an approach
which suitably provides a concrete set of proposals for differential national
allocation of responsibilities, together with a normative, global social justice-
based justification for action is the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR)
framework (Baer et al. 2008). The GDR approach aims to address distributive
conflicts over the allocation of emissions reduction targets in ways which respect
historical global inequalities in social development of human capabilities. It
assigns rights to emit GHGs to countries based on how far their populations fall
short of an agreed development threshold. As a way of establishing new rights
in international law, GDR recognizes the transboundary and intergenerational
solidarity required by the expansive logic of care, along with the asymmetries of
power that are part and parcel of caring relationships (Robinson 1999).
The GDR approach commends a variety of management tools for the
implementation of these rights. As such, it reflects a tradition of thinking about
adaptive international governance which, for some, is exemplified by measures
such as the Montréal Protocol on reducing the use of ozone depleting chemicals
(Mascarelli 2010). Adaptive governance may employ a variety of approaches at
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a variety of levels (sub-national, national, regional, global) to reduce emissions
and enhance adaptation, and will emphasize the need for reflexive and iterative
policy formation.3 Yet this form of governance is not sufficient to fully embody
a care-based perspective.
The learning process under adaptive governance requires wide stakeholder
participation, both to aid policy formulation and establish its legitimacy (Michel
2009: 262). Yet this view of governance focuses primarily on the needs of policy
makers. It might aim to elicit information from particular stakeholders and/or the
public at large – in particular, what matters to them and what may be threatened
by ACC in particular places. It might also aim to increase participation, in some
sense, in the policy process. But it needs to go beyond both these measures in
order to be effective, because to be effective it needs to treat all those affected
by ACC as active participants in their own futures, and the shorter- and longer-
term futures of those things they care about. Flourishing is tied to identity and
agency, which are enhanced or degraded by how far, and in what ways, a set of
diverse yet interdependent needs are met. Whether care is practised well or not
depends largely on how far this connection is recognized, and how far the care of
individuals for what matters to them is supported. As argued earlier, care implies
asymmetrical relationships between carers and cared-for, but these relationships
are multiple. It is not enough to treat individuals as consumers, even of care:
those who receive our care are carers too.
To be genuinely adaptive, responses to ACC need to be shaped by the active
capacity of those affected by it to express their care for what matters to them, and
for what will matter to those who succeed them. The proper role of those with
power is thus, in partnership with the relatively powerless (Robinson 1999), to
promote and support their capacity to do this. As noted above, contemporary
campaigns for the international recognition of the irreversible future impacts of
ACC have often focused on the multi-dimensional and interconnected effects of
environmental and social disruption on capacity of human beings to continue
to actively care for themselves and for what matters to them. The stories these
campaigns tell about the future differ from those offered by policy discourses,
themselves considered as a special class of narrative. In relation to ACC, policy
narratives tend to focus on the global dimension of political coordination, and
to represent politicians, policy managers and, sometimes, NGOs as the active
participants in this drama. In order to promote and support the agency of
those affected by ACC, it is necessary for people to be able to tell their own
stories of the future in order to enhance how to live gracefully and continue to
flourish amidst uncertainty. The ‘serious, and perhaps uncomfortable, questions
about who we are and what we want to be’ (Gardiner 2006: 402) that will
necessarily accompany adaptation can only be answered, initially, from the
localities where particular disruptions will be felt, producing narratives which
draw on a storehouse of attachments both to enhance resilience, and to articulate
demands for care from others who may be able to assist.
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This requirement is therefore for more than consultation. It concerns a
reimagining of what can be done, by those affected in particular places and
at particular times by ACC, to extend their own individual and collective
agency, based on their own singular attachments. Examples of such processes
of reimagining have been undertaken by the environmental artists Newton
and Helen Harrison, whose Greenhouse Britain (2007) represents a form of
storytelling about ACC which brings together scientists, engineers, ecologists,
and others who are all inhabitants of particular places in the UK, such
as the Mersey Estuary and the Lea Valley, in constructing future scenarios
concerning the effects of rising sea levels on these locations and the communities
anchored within them. By exploiting generalisable scientific knowledge and
local knowledge of connectedness, these scenarios focus on how communities
may change their ways of living as they give ground to rising waters. Through
dialogue and collaboration, the work re-injects human agency into a process
which, in traditional policy narratives, is something which simply ‘happens to’
a passive populace. The goal is both to enable people to give voice to fears and
offer them the opportunity to retrieve concrete hope in the face of uncertainty,
through their capacity for future-oriented care.
Notes
1 It is for this reason that the perspective I develop here does not fall victim to Sarah Lucia
Hoagland’s (1990) critique of Nodding’s concept of unidirectional caring as inevitably
reinforcing static inequalities of power.
2 It should be noted, of course, that they have also inherited the legacy of previous generations’
lack of care: slavery, colonialism, and of course the over-use of fossil fuels all, for example,
enter into the genealogy of the present.
3 Whatever governance model is chosen to address ACC, however, problems of power in
bargaining, implementation and enforcement will need to be faced (Thompson 2006). This
issue lies beyond the scope of this paper, however.
References
Adam, B. and Groves, C. 2007. Future Matters: Action, Knowledge, Ethics.
Leiden: Brill.
Altman, L. and Low, S. 1992. Place Attachment. New York: Plenum Press.
Baer, P. et al. 2008. ‘Greenhouse Development Rights: Towards an Equitable
Framework for Global Climate Policy’, Cambridge Review of International
Affairs 21(4): 649–69.
Baer, P. and Spash, C. L. 2008. Cost-benefit Analysis of Climate Change: Stern
Revisited. CSIRO Working Paper Series 2007–2008, May.
Barry, B. 1983. ‘Intergenerational Justice in Energy Policy’, in D. MacLean and
P. Brown (eds), Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld,
15–30.
186
The Political Imaginary of Care: Generic versus Singular Futures
Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage
Publications.
Blomme, W. 2010. ‘Precarious Balance: Challenges to Place and Home in the
Era of Climate Change’. Presented at Ninth Essex Conference in Critical
Political Theory. University of Essex (UK), 18 June 2010.
Bretherton, I. 1992. ‘The Origins of Attachment Theory: John Bowlby and Mary
Ainsworth’, Developmental Psychology 28(5): 759–75.
Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press.
Buck-Morss, S. 2000. Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass
Utopia in East and West. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Callahan, D. 1971. ‘What Obligations do we Have to Future Generations?’,
The American Ecclesiastical Review 164(4): 265–8.
de-Shalit, A. 2000. ‘Is Liberalism Environment-Friendly?’, in de-Shalit (ed.),
The Environment Between Theory and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 63–92.
Edelstein, M. R. 2004. Contaminated Communities: Coping with Residential
Toxic Exposure. Boulder, CO: Westview Books.
Engster, D. 2006. ‘Care Ethics and Animal Welfare’, Journal of Social
Philosophy 37(4): 521–36.
Engster, D. 2007. The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Farrell, K. N. 2010. Making Good Decisions Well: A Theory of Collective
Ecological Management. Aachen: Shaker Verlag.
Fine, B. 2003. Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and
Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium. London: Routledge.
Fraser, I. 1998. Hegel and Marx: The Concept of Need. Edinburgh: University
of Edinburgh Press.
Gardiner, S. M. 2006. ‘A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Inter-
generational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption’, Environmental
Values 15: 397–413.
Gheaus, A. 2010. ‘The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory, by
Daniel Engster’, European Journal of Philosophy 18(4): 619–23.
Goodin, R. 1985. Protecting the Vulnerable: A Re-Analysis of Our Social
Responsibilities. Chicago: Chicago of University Press.
Groves, C. 2009. ‘Future Ethics: Risk, Care and Non-Reciprocal Responsibility’,
Journal of Global Ethics 5(1): 17–31.
Habermas, J. 1998. ‘A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of
Morality’, in Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 3–46.
Harvey, D. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoagland, S. L. 1990. ‘Some Concerns about Nel Noddings’ Caring’, Hypatia
5(1): 109–14.
187
Christopher Groves
Jaeggi, R. 2001. ‘Solidarity and Indifference’, in R. ter Meulen et al. (eds),
Solidarity in Health and Social Care in Europe. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 287–308.
Kittay, E. F., et al. 2005. ‘Dependency, Difference and the Global Ethic of Long-
Term Care’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 13(4): 443–69.
Macintyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth.
MacLean, D. 1983. ‘A Moral Requirement for Energy Policies’, in D. MacLean
and P. Brown (eds), Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Allanheld, 180–97.
Marris, P. 1986. Loss and Change. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Marris, P. 1996. The Politics of Uncertainty: Attachment in Private and Public
Life. London; New York: Routledge.
Mascarelli, A. L. 2010. ‘A Bright Future for the Montreal Protocol’,
Environmental Science & Technology 44(5): 1518–20.
Meyer, L. H. 2005. Historische Gerechtigkeit. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Michel, D. 2009. ‘Foxes, Hedgehogs, and Greenhouse Governance: Knowledge,
Uncertainty, and International Policy-Making in a Warming World’, Applied
Energy 86(2): 258–64.
Morgan, P. 2010. ‘Towards a Developmental Theory of Place Attachment’,
Journal of Environmental Psychology 30(1): 11–22.
Nowotny, H. 2003. ‘Democratising Expertise and Socially Robust Knowledge’,
Science and Public Policy 30: 151–6.
O’Connor, M. 1994. ‘On the Misadventures of Capitalist Nature’, in M.
O’Connor (ed.), Is Capitalism Sustainable? Political Economy and the
Politics of Ideology. New York: Guilford Press, 125–51.
O’Neill, J. 1993. Ecology, Policy and Politics. London: Routledge.
O’Neill, J., et al. 2008. Environmental Values. Abingdon: Routledge.
Parfit, D. 1986. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pellizzoni, L. 2004. ‘Responsibility and Environmental Governance’,
Environmental Politics 13(3): 541–65.
Ravetz, J. 2004. ‘The Post-Normal Science of Precaution’, Futures 36(3):
347–57.
Rawls, J. 1972. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Robinson, F. 1999. Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International
Relations. Oxford: Westview Press.
Rothstein, H. et al. 2006. ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling
Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk’, Economy and Society
35(1): 91–112.
Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, B. 1973. Utilitarianism: For and Against.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stern, D. N. 1985. The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from
Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology. New York: Basic Books.
188
The Political Imaginary of Care: Generic versus Singular Futures
Stern, D. N. et al. 1998. The Birth of a Mother: How Motherhood Changes You
Forever. London: Bloomsbury.
Thompson, A. 2006. ‘Management Under Anarchy: The International Politics
of Climate Change’, Climatic Change 78(1): 7–29.
Tronto, J. C. 1993. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care.
New York: Routledge.
van Hooft, S. 1995. Caring: An Essay in the Philosophy of Ethics. Colorado:
University Press of Colorado.
Wallendorf, M. and Arnould, E. J. 1988. “‘My Favourite Things”: A Cross-
Cultural Inquiry into Object Attachment, Possessiveness, and Social Linkage’,
Journal of Consumer Research 14: 531–47.
Wynne, B. 1992. ‘Uncertainty and Environmental Learning – Reconceiving
Science and Policy in the Preventive Paradigm’, Global Environmental
Change-Human and Policy Dimensions 2(2): 111–27.
Young, R. M. 1989. ‘Transitional Phenomena: Production and Consumption’, in
B. Richards (ed.), Crises of the Self: Further Essays on Psychoanalysis and
Politics. London: Free Association Books, 57–72.
189
